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Brain Theory Between Utopia 
and Dystopia: Neuronormativity 
Meets the Social Brain 
Charles Wolfe 
Forthcoming in M. Pasquinelli, ed., Alleys of Your Mind (Lüneburg: meson 
press, 2015). 
The brain in its plasticity and inherent ‘sociality’ can be 
proclaimed and projected as a revolutionary organ. Far from the 
old reactions which opposed the authenticity of political theory 
and praxis to the dangerous naturalism of ‘cognitive science’ 
(with images of men in white coats, the RAND Corporation or 
military LSD experiments), recent decades have shown us some 
of the potentiality of the social brain (Vygotsky, and more 
recently Negri 1995 and Negri 2000, Virno 2001). Is the brain 
somehow inherently a utopian topos? If in some earlier papers I 
sought to defend naturalism against these reactions, here I 
consider a new challenge: the recently emerged disciplines of 
neuronormativity, which seek in their own way to overcome the 
nature-normativity divide. This is the task of a materialist brain 
theory today.  
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1. The setup: horns of a dilemma  
There is a lingering zone of what one might think of as sore cognitive muscle tissue in 
the area of materialism. It is an area of both contested territory and in some cases, a 
kind of pathos of distance of the ‘Ugh! Keep that thing away from me!’ sort. I have in 
mind the combination of materialism as an emancipatory socio-political project (which 
need not be construed in strictly Marx-Engels terms, if we think of Lucretius et al.) and 
as a cold-hearted ‘spontaneous philosophy of the men in white coats’, e.g. nefarious 
neurophilosophers. Faced with this rather massive alternative, this choice between two 
projects, I have stubbornly been saying since some discussions with Negri in the late 
90s,1 we should choose: both! And for people steeped in a Germanic tradition I can 
push the following familiar button and say, this is also about ceasing to take for 
granted a distinction between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften. If the brain is always 
already social, as even Marx states (see Wolfe 2010), this implies, although not with 
necessary implicature, that knowledge of the brain is not irrelevant to knowledge of 
the social world.
2
 No absolute divide between a hermeneutical world of free, self-
interpreting subjects with their values, norms and struggles, and a natural world of 
quantities, electroencephalograms, ‘men in white coats’ (as Husserl feared in his 
diatribes against naturalism) and so-called ‘science’. 
But even this choice of ‘both’, in which the brain is, now a naturalistic object of study 
like a liver or a lung, now a political object (dual-aspect?), leads us, like a gamer-agent 
in a virtual world, into further pathways with further choices of which doors to go 
through. For the brain is frequently presented both as a potential site and substance of 
radical transformation – a utopian form of ‘wonder tissue’, a ‘difference machine’, an 
‘uncertain system’ and, quite symmetrically, as the focus and resource of consumer 
neuroscience, semiocapital3 or neurocapitalism. It’s a bit like the old chestnut about 
the saving power lying where the greatest danger is,
4
 except the other way round. 
Indeed, regarding the fields of neuronormativity, Slaby and Gallagher have recently 
observed that “the particular construal of self currently championed by social 
neuroscience – with a focus on social-interactive skills, low-level empathy and mind-
reading – neatly corresponds with the ideal skill profile of today’s corporate employee” 
(Slaby and Gallagher 2014). 
I neither want to add a grain of salt or a brick in the wall to either side of this brain 
dilemma – which is not exactly the opposition between the Natural and the Normative, 
since the former (a Vygotsky-Churchland-Negri club) asserts that the brain is social 
                                           
1 See Negri’s rather subtle comments on forms of materialism, from the more naturalistic to the 
more political, in the original Italian preface to Alma Venus, Negri 2000. 
2 The notion of social brain (the “general productive forces of the social brain”) appears in 
Marx’s Grundrisse, notebooks VI-VII, a text known as the “Fragment on Machines” (Marx 1973, 
694) which has had particular influence on the Italian Autonomist tradition. This is different 
from the better-known claim in the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach that “Human essence in its 
actuality is the sum (Ensemble) of social relations.” 
3 Franco Berardi’s term for our world of “post-Fordist modes of production” (cf. Terranova 
2014). 
4 “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst/Das Rettende auch” (Hölderlin, “Patmos”, 1803). 
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and material (and that this combination is potentially emancipatory), whereas the 
latter, like Cassandra warns of the danger.5 For the latter kind of denunciation can 
come, not from old style humanistic Marxism (or Catholic bioethics, or Raymond Tallis), 
but from farther Left, as with Tiqqun’s piece of learned, paranoid critique of the 
dangers of “the cybernetic hypothesis” (Tiqqun 2001).6  
Faced with this kind of knee-jerk, or is it die-hard, anti-cognitivism, one could respond 
by reassuring the interlocutor: no, tovarich, I may read the Churchlands but my heart 
is in the right place. Or by calling my interlocutor a paleo-Marxist, not up to date with 
immaterial and cognitive turns. I might suggest more broadly a classic ‘divide and 
conquer’ move: what would the anti-cognitivist say about a thinker like Guattari, who 
denied, “as opposed to a thinker such as Heidegger,” that “the machine is something 
which turns us away from being”?  
I think that the machinic phyla are agents productive of being. They make us enter 
into what I call an ontological heterogenesis… The whole question is knowing how 
the enunciators of technology, including biological, aesthetic, theoretical, machines, 
etc., are assembled, of refocusing the purpose of human activities on the 
production of subjectivity or collective assemblages of subjectivity. (Guattari 2011, 
50) 
Biological, aesthetic and we might add, cerebral machines (that is, entities and 
relations) are constitutive parts of the production of subjectivity, rather than its ‘Other’. 
But, in our desire to embrace both horns of the dilemma and be naturalists who are 
not guilty of scientism etc., maybe we have gone Guattarian too quick, that is, in a 
kind of feel-good Spinozism (Simondonisme?) where everything is relational hence 
nothing is taboo. In that sense, the suspicion of cognitivism might be operating at a 
more fine-grained level. 
Yet perhaps the suspicion towards cognitivism is not just dogmatic, 1950s humanist 
Marxism, even if it has its ‘knee-jerk’ moments. We can see this if we now turn to a 
new case, that of the emergent but already popular disciplines of neuronormativity. If 
we seek to achieve some critical distance towards these disciplines, it does not mean 
we are reverting to the anti-naturalism I have discussed above. That is, we are no 
longer in a 1980s-style opposition between humanists like Ricoeur or Habermas, and 
neuroscientists / propagandists like Changeux; we are now faced with the rise of the 
‘neuro’-disciplines 
2. Neurohumanities and neuronormativity 
The prefix neuro- has become ubiquitous in numerous scientific and loosely scientific 
disciplines, offering as it does a surplus of concrete, supposedly experimentally 
                                           
5 On the anecdotal level, I recall some people warning the Multitudes mailing-list in the early 
2000s that I, the moderator, was a danger (perhaps a Rand Corporation agent?) because I was 
participating in a meeting on brains! 
6  Those who attended the Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism conference at the ICI in 
Berlin in March 2013 could hear Maurizio Lazzarato’s denunciation of ‘cognitivism’ and ‘science’. 
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substantiated brain explanations for various hotly debated phenomena (from 
punishment and free will to gender and economic decision-making). But as Jan De Vos 
has observed, this trend has led to a doubly unfortunate effect: the weakening of the 
relation of any of these projects to actual neuroscience, and the weakening of the 
discipline of which they are the ‘neuro’ version (De Vos 2014; see also Ortega and 
Vidal 2011). De Vos quotes Matthew Taylor, a British Labour Party activist and 
government adviser under Tony Blair, who claimed that insights from neurological 
research offered a more solid base “than previous attempts to move beyond left and 
right” (Taylor 2009). To the 1980s-type fascination with ‘my brain is my self’, the last 
decade has responded with a particularly vacuous version of a social turn, conveyed in 
a variety of expressions, from ‘neurocapitalism’ and ‘neuropolitics’ to the possibility of 
neuroenhanced individuals possessing a ‘neurocompetitive advantage’ (Lynch 2004; 
Schmitz 2014).  
One problem would be the potentially illusory character of such promised 
developments. But another problem is in a sense the exact opposite, namely, if 
neuroenhancement is real, what about ‘the freedom to remain unenhanced’ in a 
context where schools, in a country we don’t need to name, are coercing parents to 
medicate their children for attention dysfunction (Farah 2005, 37)? Or (in an example 
given in Bickle and Hardcastle 2012), treatments for dementia will most likely lead to 
drugs that increase mnemonic recollection or recall in normal brains as well: would 
using this drug cross an ethical line from acceptable medical treatments to 
unacceptable cognitive enhancements if given to members of the general population? 
An even stronger embrace of ‘neurolaw’ is, for instance, in a recent essay on “The 
significance of psychopaths for ethical and legal reasoning” by Hirstein and Sifferd 
(2014). If positron emission tomography (PET) studies have already shown that some 
convicted murderers have significantly attenuated functioning in their prefrontal cortex 
(a region known to be involved in cognitive control and planning), it is an open book 
for jurists to plead attenuated responsibility in terms of prior cerebral dispositions. But 
they take the reasoning one step further, focusing on the specific case of psychopaths 
and their diminished sense of moral empathy or responsibility. Hirstein and Sifferd 
effectively argue that the courts need to be practicing ‘neurolaw’ in order to monitor 
psychopathic prisoners more closely. Somewhere here there is also the danger of so-
called brain-realism. As per Dumit 2003 (see also De Vos, ms. and Schmitz), our 
society seems to place increased weight on brain data compared with other kinds of 
data. A legal concern is that brain scans and other pieces of such information will 
somehow trump other evidence in legal proceedings (Gordijn and Giordano 2010, 
discussed in Bickle and Hardcastle 2012). 
So, thinking back to my embracing answer ‘Both!’ at the beginning to the question: 
emancipatory materialism or handing ourselves over to men or robots in white coats?  
Must this ‘Both!’ bear the combined masks of the neuro-adviser to Tony Blair and that 
of the philosophers recommending that courts practice ‘neurolaw’? As you may guess, 
my answer is No, or rather NIET, with Soviet accents. 
3. Two materialisms = two brain theories 
5 
Brains are culturally sedimented; permeated in their material architecture by our 
culture, history and social organization, and this sedimentation is itself reflected in 
cortical architecture, as first clearly argued perhaps by the brilliant Soviet 
neuropsychologist Lev Vygotsky in the early twentieth century. A major figure in fields 
including social psychology, developmental psychology and a kind of heretical Marxism 
(but one not afraid to invoke the brain), Vygotsky strongly emphasized the 
embeddedness of the brain in the social world, arguing that there may even be 
evidence of consequences in our central nervous system derived from early social 
interaction, so that past experience is embodied in synaptic modifications. As his 
younger collaborator Alexander Luria put it, “Social history ties the knots that produce 
new correlations between certain zones of the cerebral cortex” (Luria 2002, 22).7 Less 
dramatically stated, in a recent summary by the cognitive archaeologist Lambros 
Malafouris: “Our minds and brains are (potentially) subject to constant change and 
alteration caused by our ordinary developmental engagement with cultural practices 
and the material world” (Malafouris 2010). Notice that this is materialism sensu stricto, 
as it is a description of the properties of brains. But this is not exactly materialism of 
the Churchland-Bickle-Place sort. Which would be more this, with a naïve picture of 
science replacing philosophy:  
[I]t would seem that the long reign of the philosopher as the professional in charge 
of the mind-body problem is finally coming to its end. Just as has happened in the 
lifetime of most of us in the case of the origins of the universe which used to be a 
theological problem and is now an astronomical one, so the mind-body problem is 
about to pass from the grasp of the philosopher into that of the neuropsychologist. 
(Place 1997, 16) 
Instead, the mind-brain materialism of Vygotsky (for whom “History, changing the 
human type, depends on the cortex; the new socialist man will be created through the 
cortex; upbringing is in general an influence upon the cortex”)8 is both less passive 
and less mechanistic. In this sense it is not a scientism or a denial of the symbolic and 
valuative dimensions of life, as we are still told about materialism (e.g. the danger of 
materialism in the humanities, Hawkes 2011). Following a helpful and suggestive 
response of John Sutton and Lyn Tribble to Hawkes’ claims that materialism will 
destroy the symbolic, valuative, representational content in literature (we could 
imagine the same said about art: indeed I have heard Diederich Diederichsen say this 
about applying study of the brain to aesthetics), materialism need not claim that ‘only 
matter exists’, but is instead ‘firmly pluralist’ in its ontologies.  
Even if all the things that exist supervene on or are realized in matter, the 
materialist can still ascribe full-blown reality to tables and trees and tendons and 
toenails and tangos and tendencies”; an account including the brain need not 
exclude “memories, affects, beliefs, imaginings, dreams, decisions, and the whole 
                                           
7 Iriki (2009) is a recent comparable illustration of this. 
8 Vygotsky, Pedologija Podrotska. Moscow, 1929. Quoted in van der Veer and Valsiner 1991, 
320. Further discussion in Wolfe 2010. 
6 
array of psychological phenomena of interest to literary, cultural, and historical 
theorists. (Sutton and Tribble 2011). 
The materialism of the ‘cultured brain’ (as in Vygotsky or recent work in cognitive 
archaeology or tools and cognition, Iriki 2009) is very much of this sort: it integrates 
the brain and the affects, cerebral architecture and our aptitude to produce fictions… 
But notice that it is not enough to rebut these ‘antelapsarian’ visions of a cold, dead 
materialism seizing living value, sentiment and meaning in its embrace and reducing 
them to piles of inert matter. For just as there is bad neuronormativity and a more 
positive sense of the social brain, we must be careful to separate the cultured brain 
concept from ‘neuroaesthetics’ which claims to integrate materialism, brain science and 
art but in the flattest way: “I picture a future for writing that dispenses with mystery 
wherever it can, that embraces the astounding strides in thought-organ research. 
Ideally, a future where neuroimaging both miniaturises and becomes widespread, 
augmenting the craft of authors, critics, agents and publishing houses” (Walter 2012). 
Note that I have slipped into discussion of forms of materialism (and their relation to 
brains), perhaps unconsciously adopting the posture of the philosopher. A different but 
complementary way of evaluating Place-Churchland type claims would be to look at 
precisely their 21st century outcomes, namely, claims from cognitive neuroscience and 
its extensions to deal with new areas like ethics, the law and the rest of 
‘neurohumanities’. This is what ‘critical neuroscience’ does (see Choudhury and Slaby 
2012). 
As its name indicates, the critical neuroscience program aims in part to criticize current 
developments, particularly in cognitive neuroscience (Choudhury, Nagel and Slaby 
2009, 73). This can include the already-familiar social critique of our fascination with 
brain imaging (but also methodological problems inherent in fMRI analyses), the newer 
critique of ‘brain-centric’ explanations of personhood, agency, moral life et al., and 
also, scientifically informed challenges to exaggerated and otherwise ideological 
reports of neuroscientific findings in popular media (including in the neuropolitical 
sphere, as discussed below), but also in fields such as the ‘neurohumanities’. Just as 
we are often confronted with bogus neuroscientific explanations (or ‘aids’) in political 
decision-making or religious belief, similarly, certain current forms of neuroaesthetic 
discourse will seek to augment literary scholarship by telling us that in reading literary 
prose, “the line ‘he had leathery hands’ has just stimulated your sensory cortex in a 
way ‘he had rough hands’ can never hope to” (Walter 2012).  
4. Conclusion 
We have witnessed a series of tensions, most classically between a kind of Marx-
Heidegger humanism and a purported brain science, and more interestingly, between 
two visions of socially embedded, plastic brains, namely that of Tony Blair’s advisor 
(Left brain / Right brain so to speak) versus the Vygotskian ‘socialist cortex’, i.e. the 
brain as potential Communist caisse de résonance. Similar but not identical to the 
latter opposition would be that between current discourses of neuronormativity, and 
7 
the Vygotsky-Negri line in which brain science is not merely facilitating a state of socio-
political status quo, but is potentially destabilizing. 
The same applies to the opposition between types of materialism, in which the latter, 
more plastic variety also embraces ‘cultured brain’ materialism. One can think of the 
Baldwin effect (in which cultural/linguistic evolution combines with Darwinian 
evolution). The Baldwin effect is very close, in fact, to the promise of the social brain, 
namely, that “the human cerebral cortex [is] an organ of civilization in which are 
hidden boundless possibilities” (Luria 2002, 22)9 , and of course also to Deleuze’s 
‘neuroaesthetic’ vision in which “Creating new circuits in art means creating them in 
the brain” (Deleuze 1995, 60). This Baldwin-Vygotsky-Deleuze vision is tantamount to 
saying, to use Negri’s words, that “Geist is the brain”. Negri is deliberately being 
provocative with regard to the German ‘hermeneutical’ tradition, although his interests 
lie less in the realm of the social brain, and more towards a politics of affects (Negri 
1995, 98). That properties of Geist such as its interpretive capacity, its social and 
intersubjective dimension, are in fact properties of the brain means – and I wish to 
insist on this point – that these are not just accounts of interaction between two 
distinct entities or fields of activity (e.g. brain and society, brain and symbolic relations, 
nature and freedom…), nor an insistence that what matters is strictly the world of 
language in which we live, irreducible to the brain understood as a passive machine. 
A question left unspoken, but somehow present here, is: does the ‘social brain’ 
materialist have to grant special ontological status to the brain? Does she have to hold, 
in the terms of ‘brain theorists’ Thomas Metzinger and Vittorio Gallese (2003, 549) that 
“the brain possesses an ontology too”? For materialism sensu Place, or his colleague 
JJC Smart, the brain does not have an ontology. There is physics, and anything above 
(both biology and neuroscience) are like special kinds of radio engineering (Smart 
1959, 142). In contrast, in a Suttonian fluidity of animal spirits or Diderot’s description 
of the brain as ‘the book which reads itself’, it does. But how can materialism maintain 
that the brain has an ontology without reintroducing ‘kingdoms within kingdoms’ (in 
Spinoza’s celebrated way of describing the belief he challenged, that there were special 
laws and properties of human nature, different from the laws of nature as a whole; 
Hardt and Negri 2000, 91)? Like in Victoria Pitts-Taylor’s critique of these ‘wonder 
tissue’, transcendental potentia of brain, biopolitical monster: “The brain not only 
appears to us (through neuroscientific revelations) to be ontologically open to shaping, 
but (if the theory is right) it is always already actively shaped and shaping. Thus 
plasticity cannot be seen as an ontological condition captured, or not, by capital, or as 
a biological fact to be freed from social and cultural ones” (Pitts-Taylor 2010, 648).10 If 
                                           
9 Luria is glossing on Vygotsky, whose last, posthumously published work, “Psychology and the 
Localization of Mental Functions” explicitly aimed to investigate the functional organization of 
the brain as the organ of consciousness (Luria 2002, 23). The development of new ‘functional 
organs’ occurs through the development of new functional systems, which is a means for the 
unlimited development of cerebral activity (Luria 2002, 19, 22).  
10 Pitts-Taylor’s more general observation about the appeal of the concept of plasticity is worth 
citing: “For a number of scholars in a range of fields, plasticity offers the possibility of taking up 
the biological matter of the body while defying biological determinism. For sociologists of the 
body and medicine who have been looking for ways to overcome the limitations of social 
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we over-ontologise the brain in order to not be mystical dualists or knee-jerk anti-
scientists, we may also run the risk of reconfiguring humanity as just “a cerebral 
crystallization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 197-198).11 Not unlike e.g. the way recent 
Continental mystagogies of the brain (to be sure, they are not anti-naturalisms like the 
various conceptual characters on the left side of my little diagrams) in which “the 
frontier between the empirical and the transcendental is ‘deconstructed’ within the 
materiality of the brain” (Williams 2013) – or ‘wonder tissue’, also as noted by Pitts-
Taylor above. 
The other remaining question which I have mentioned several times is: if brain and 
politics are not two opposed spheres, does this have an emancipatory potential? The 
brain’s potentia against the rule-concept of potestas (the immanent and constitutive 
essence of a living being that desires what is good for its being, versus power as the 
transcendent power of command assumed by rulers). In equally utopian tones 
Pasquinelli (2014, 298) approvingly cites Metzinger’s neuropedagogy and 
Consciousness Revolution as “the militant response of contemporary living labor to the 
regime of cognitive capitalism”. In fact, I like the sobering way Lazzarato puts it: art 
and culture are “neither more nor less integrated” into the society of control and 
security than any other activity, and they have “the same potential and ambiguities as 
any other activity” (Lazzarato 2008, 174). There is little to be gained by investing 
either a substance (brain, frontal cortex, organism) or a potentiality (including that of 
“ritournellisation” or “existentialisation,” in Guattari’s processual terms) with an 
absolute saving power. This, however, does not change the way in which a Spinozist 
politics of brain and affects (Wolfe 2014) is an improvement over those planifications 
which lay out a blueprint for action, with a hierarchy of actors assigned to their 
unmoving roles, à la DIAMAT and the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
So, again: navigating between the Charybdis of apolitical neuronormativity, where 
Churchland becomes Philip K. Dick (…neurolegal attempts to identify psychopaths 
before they commit crimes), and the Scylla of comfortable Marxist anti-naturalism, I 
find support in Negri’s provocative affirmation, Geist is the brain. But which brain? 
Neither the brain of forceps or MRI-wielding ‘men in white coats’, nor the brain of the 
bad neuroaesthetic theorization of how, in reading prose, “the line ‘He had leathery 
hands’ has just stimulated your sensory cortex in a way ‘he had rough hands’ can 
never hope to” (Walter 2012). Against static materialism I oppose the combined fervor 
                                                                                                                                         
constructionism, brain plasticity appears to present the material body in a way that opens up, 
rather than closes down, sociocultural accounts of embodied subjectivity. In psychology, 
plasticity may offer those opposed to materialist views of both normative development and 
psychic suffering a way to account for physiological aspects of both without endorsing 
evolutionary or hard-wired views. For postmodernists, poststructuralists, and others interested 
not only in displacing the liberal subject but also in productive alternatives, plasticity seems to 
offer positive chaos, creativity, and multisubjectivity. For those pursuing posthumanism at 
various levels, plasticity renders the world as an infinite source of ‘wideware’ for the brain, and 
positions the individual brain as inherently connected to others – things, artifacts, other brains” 
(Pitts-Taylor 647).   
11 In response to the phenomenologist Erwin Straus’s ‘humanist’ statement that “It is man who 
thinks, not the brain” (in Erwin Straus, Du sens des sens. Grenoble: J. Millon, 1989, original 
publication 1935, 183).  
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of the Bolshevik invocation of the socialist cortex – as if, contrary to present, tedious 
attacks on ‘dangerous naturalism’ à la Virno, the true radical Marxism was in the brain 
(Wolfe 2010, Pasquinelli 2014) – and Negri’s incantatory assertion that ‘the brain is the 
biopolitical monster’ (cit. in Wolfe 2008). Granted, we might take a dose of deflationary 
realism towards such utopias; yet they are infinitely more sympathetic than the 
melancholy cynicism of the déraciné architecture theorists, the gleeful naïveté of 
metaphysicians of the prosthesis, or (again) the reactive, fearful anti-naturalisms, anti-
cerebralisms of some our fellow-travellers. 
 
Thanks to Matteo Pasquinelli and Pieter Present for their comments. 
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